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Non-compliance with regulations is a complex problem in recreational fisheries
management, having the potential to evoke uncertainty for conservation and socio-
ecological outcomes and to undermine management efforts. While we know that in
fisheries people make trade-offs between following or breaking rules, it is of interest
to determine how people respond to different management incentives to curtail
non-compliance. The overall aim of this study is to examine what individual psycho-
social characteristics are associated with responses to instrumental and normative
management incentives in a recreational fisheries context through the use of an
economic experiment. We examined five psycho-social characteristics, three of which
(expectation of behavior of others, social norms, and risk preferences) have separately
been explored within the fisheries compliance literature, while two factors (ecological
values and personality types) have yet to be explored. While information about
these two latter characteristics is limited within the fisheries compliance literature, our
results suggest that they are relevant predictors for certain compliance groups across
compliance incentives. The findings underline that there is significant heterogeneity in the
associations between psycho-social make-up and compliance behaviors. Knowledge
of this behavioral relationship can progress fisheries management toward increased
innovation by encouraging the management of the individual fisher rather than the
average fisher.
Keywords: economic experiment, social norms, fisheries management, psycho-social characteristics, marine
social science
INTRODUCTION
Marine recreational fisheries are ecologically, culturally, and economically important. Recreational
fisheries are generally managed as a regulated open access resource, but the common pool
nature of recreational fisheries makes them vulnerable to overexploitation. The success of fisheries
management depends on factors such as strong leadership, social capital, and incentives (Gutiérrez
et al., 2011) as well as having congruent objectives (Hilborn, 2007), and good governance (Potts
et al., 2020). Recreational fisheries are traditionally managed via a mixture of regulations and rules
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(Morison, 2004). However, achieving an acceptable rate of
compliance in recreational fisheries is inherently difficult because
there is often no formal mechanism to monitor and record
the actions of recreational fishers (Green and McKinlay, 2009).
Additionally, due to the high numbers and wide distribution
of fishers enforcement of rules and regulations for recreational
fishing is costly and typically low (Raakjær Nielsen and
Mathiesen, 2003; King and Sutinen, 2010). Non-compliance is a
tenacious problem in recreational fisheries management, posing a
risk to marine conservation and socio-ecological systems (Blank
and Gavin, 2009; Smallwood and Beckley, 2012; Arias and Sutton,
2013). In fisheries management, deterrence-based approaches
have traditionally been used to tackle non-compliance. However,
sufficient monitoring and enforcement are often limited and
prohibitively costly in recreational fisheries (Cooke et al., 2013).
Understanding compliance behavior of recreational fishers is
thus of great policy and management relevance. In response
to this, behavior change initiatives that are not based solely
on deterrence methods are beginning to be proposed and
implemented to improve compliance (Battista et al., 2018;
Mackay et al., 2018). Compliance is typically framed as a binary
issue, wherein fishers are either compliant or not, with substantial
research directed at measuring and identifying compliance
(Honneland, 1999; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Thomas et al.,
2016; Bergseth et al., 2017). Increasingly, attention has focussed
toward understanding the drivers and motivations of compliant
and non-compliant behaviors (Boonstra et al., 2017) with several
theories being proposed to explain why individuals engage in
compliant behaviors (Bottoms, 2002).
For example, instrumental theories suggest that the decision of
whether to comply or not is based on self-interested calculations
about the expected costs and benefits of compliance, and that
non-compliance occurs because the cost outweigh the benefits
(Becker, 1968). Rules and regulations for recreational fishing are
traditionally designed and implemented based on the assumption
that fishers are instrumental actors (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999)
with reported instances of improved compliance with more
enforcement (Gigliotti and Taylor, 2004). Normative theories, on
the other hand, argue intrinsic values, such as an individual’s
perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of rules, are crucial
to fishers’ decisions about compliance (Nielsen, 2003; Nielsen
and Mathiesen, 2003; Grimes, 2006; Viteri and Chávez, 2007).
In accordance to this theory, there are cases of high compliance
where there is weak enforcement and low penalties due to
established normative behavioral drivers (Sutinen and Kuperan,
1999; Gezelius, 2002, 2003).
In addition to instrumental and normative drivers, the
literature suggests that psycho-social characteristics of
individuals, such as attitudes, personality traits, and specific
values toward the good in question, are important factors
determining the patterns in individual compliance behavior
(Nielsen, 2003). Key psycho-social characteristics that have been
attributed to compliance behavior are social norms, such as
morality and social reputation (Milner-Gulland and Rowcliffe,
2007; Challender and MacMillan, 2014; Arias, 2015). There are
several examples drawn from fisheries as well as wider literature
that build a strong case for the application of social norms in
fisheries compliance management (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998;
Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Thomas et al., 2016). For example,
empirical studies of norm conformity show that focusing people
on an existing norm is an important step toward compliance
(Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno et al., 1993). Another psycho-social
characteristic influencing compliance behavior is expectation
of others’ compliance behavior as it reflects social perceptions
(Bergseth and Roscher, 2018). Expectations about others’ choices
have been found to significantly predict one’s own choice
(Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Bova et al., 2017). Often expectation
of others’ compliance behavior will reflect an individual’s own
behavior. The expectation of others’ behavior is regularly over-
estimated, for example fishers who poach may also overestimate
the prevalence of poaching (Berkowitz, 2005; Rimal and Real,
2005; Bergseth and Roscher, 2018).
Other psycho-social characteristics are ecological values and
personality types. Environmental ethics literature suggests that
having strong ecological values should render high compliance
rates where non-compliance would result in some form of
environmental degradation (Brennan and Lo, 2002; Nuyen,
2011). Broadly, ecological values and attitudes are key drivers
of environmental behavior which relevant for non-compliance
issues related to fisheries (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Stern
and Dietz, 1994; Ones et al., 2015). The relationships between
personality types and compliance behaviors is not prevelant in
fisheries compliance literature. However, personalty types, such
as openness, extraversion and neuroticism, have been linked
with rates of policy violations (McBride et al., 2012) within
other compliance literatures. Compliance and co-operation, on
the other hand, has been linked to agreeableness (Digman and
Takemoto-Chogk, 1981; Graziano and Eisenberg, 1997; Graziano
et al., 1997). Finally, individuals’ risk preferences have been found
to be correlated with compliance with fisheries regulations (Brick
et al., 2012; Girardin et al., 2017).
The overall aim of this study is to examine what psycho-
social characteristics of individuals are associated with responses
to instrumental and normative management incentives in a
recreational fisheries context. While there is literature reviewing
and testing some of the characteristics mentioned relating to
compliance behaviors in fishing and non-fishing contexts, there is
a gap in the literature exploring these characteristics concurrently
within a controlled experimental setting. To achieve this aim, we
conducted a laboratory-based common pool resource economic
experiment in which participants faced four hypothetical fishery
scenarios where compliance is measured in terms of whether
participants exceed a catch limit. The fishing scenarios use
a combination of normative and instrumental incentives to
encourage compliance behavior with a catch limit. Building on
the results of Mackay et al. (2019) which presents the results
for each of the four scenarios comparing the normative and
instrumental incentives, here we examine both consistency and
variation in behavior across the four scenarios. In doing so
we can isolate the effects of an instrumental and normative
incentive in both a low deterrence and a high deterrence
context. The implication of such a study will contribute to the
gap in identifying if there are any patterns in psycho-social
characteristics for those who are consistently compliant, those
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of data collection within experiment in order. Segments colors represent each of the data collected; teal represents the catch/compliance
data, pink represents risk preferences, green represents social norm values, purple represents ecological values and dark red represents personality types.
TABLE 1 | Specifications of the fishery scenarios [adapted from Mackay et al. (2019)].
Fishery scenario Level of deterrence
(instrumental incentive)
Normative message included
(normative incentive)
Regulation reminder statement
Scenario 1 5% No There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish. There is a 5% chance that you will
come across an inspector on your fishing trip who will be checking if
you are within the catch limit.
Scenario 2 5% Yes There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish, but according to last year’s data
the average fisher chose to catch only ONE (1) fish. There is a 5%
chance that you will come across an inspector on your fishing trip who
will be checking if you are within the catch limit.
Scenario 3 20% No There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish. There is a 20% chance that you
will come across an inspector on your fishing trip who will be checking if
you are within the catch limit.
Scenario 4 20% Yes There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish, but according to last year’s data
the average fisher chose to catch only ONE (1) fish. There is a 20%
chance that you will come across an inspector on your fishing trip who
will be checking if you are within the catch limit.
who free-ride, and those who are influenced as intended by
improving compliant behavior for different incentives.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Compliance Decision Data Collection
We collected compliance decision data by running an economic
experiment in which student participants faced four hypothetical
scenarios in a recreational fishery context (Figure 1). The
experiment was run for 20 sessions with 120 student participants
(i.e., 6 students × 20 sessions) at the University of Tasmania,
Australia from 12 May to 2 June 2017. At the start of each session,
participants were provided an information sheet and consent
form, in accordance with ethics approval from the Tasmania
Social Sciences Human Research Ethical Committee (Ethics Ref:
H0016420). The experiment was designed to reflect the common
pool resource context of recreational fishing with groups of six
anonymous participants fishing individualistically from the same
resource. This design is a standard static common pool resource
game used in economic experiments (Cardenas, 2011; Castillo
et al., 2011). For more detail on the experimental process and
design please see Mackay et al. (2019).
For each session, a group of six participants earned money by
‘catching fish’, which reflects the enjoyment fishers receive from
going fishing. The amount they earned was based on how many
fish they decided to catch and the group total catch. Specifically,
as each person caught more fish they earned more money,
however, as the group’s total catch increased ceteris paribus, the
individual’s reward for catching additional fish decreased. The
payoff function is detailed in Supplementary Appendix A. To
measure compliance, we set an individual catch limit of two
fish, but each fisher had the option to catch up to five fish in
each fishing scenario. Catch equal to or below the catch limit
was categorized as compliant and catch higher than the limit
was non-compliant.
We encouraged compliance with the catch limit using a
combination of two management incentives, specifically an
instrumental (i.e., level of deterrence) and a normative incentive
(i.e., social norm message), resulting in four scenarios (Table 1).
These were delivered through regulation reminders prior to
catch decisions for each scenario. The instrumental management
incentive was applied by setting the probability of having the
catch inspected at either 5 or 20% to create low and high levels of
deterrence. If inspected and found to have caught more fish than
the limit, the participant received a payoff of zero. The normative
management incentive was framed around a descriptive social
norm. The norm depicted the catch of a typical fisher in a
hypothetical fishery and was given alongside the reminder of the
catch limit and level of deterrence (Table 1). The exact wording
of the normative message was; “according to last year’s data the
average fisher chose to catch only ONE (1) fish.” The experiment
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FIGURE 2 | Fishery compliance cases. Using the four experimental fishery scenarios three compliance cases are defined by comparing compliance decisions in a
base scenario and a comparison scenario. The three compliance cases are: (1) normative incentive in a low deterrence context, (2) normative incentive in a high
deterrence context, and, (3) an instrumental incentive via an increase in deterrence.
is a within-subject design in which each participant took part
in all four fishery scenarios. To mitigate the potential ordering
effect, the order of the scenarios was randomized for each session.
In this study, our interest is in understanding the association
between individual’s psycho-social characteristics and their
response to management incentives aimed at improving
compliance outcomes. Specifically, we draw on the fishery
scenarios to define three compliance cases, each comprising
a base scenario and a comparison scenario in which either a
normative or instrumental incentive is applied (Figure 2). For
compliance case 1, we compare behaviors with and without a
normative incentive in a low deterrence context (Scenario 1 and
Scenario 2 in Table 1). For compliance case 2, we compare
behaviors with and without the normative incentive in a high
deterrence context (Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 in Table 1). The
third compliance case observes the influence of an increase
in deterrence without the normative incentive (Scenario 1 and
Scenario 3 in Table 1).
Compliance Response Groups
We constructed the categorical compliance response variable
based on participants compliance decisions within the base
scenario and comparison scenario (Figure 3A) resulting in
four nominal categories, namely; (i) the compliers, (ii) the
free-riders, (iii) the incentivized, and (iv) the non-compliers.
First, the compliers are those who were consistently compliant
for both base and comparison scenarios. The free-riders are
those who were compliant in the base scenario and non-
compliant in the comparison scenario. The participants who
behaved this way are named the free-riders as they have
responded to the incentive in an unintended way, possibly
in an attempt to maximize payoff on the assumption that
others will comply in response to the management incentive
resulting in their own increased catch yielding a higher
return. Third, the incentivized, who were non-compliant
in the base scenario and compliant in the comparison
scenario, are named as such as they have responded as
intended to the management incentive. The final group, the
non-compliers, were consistently non-compliant across both
scenarios. Each of the four compliance response groups are
potentially characterized by different psycho social-factors
which is shown conceptually in Figure 3B) and is the
hypothesis empirically tested in this study to answer the overall
research question.
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FIGURE 3 | Conceptual model of the research procedure. (A) Compliance decisions made in the base and comparison scenarios define the four compliance
response groups (the compliers, the free-riders, the incentivized, and the non-compliers. (B) The research aims to identify a pattern in the five psycho-social
characteristics of individuals in the four compliance response groups.
TABLE 2 | Distribution of the number of participants within the four compliance groups for each of the compliance cases.
Compliance response group Compliance response Compliance case
Base scenario Comparison scenario (1) Normative in
low deterrence
(2) Normative in
high deterrence
(3) Instrumental by
increase in deterrence
The compliers Comply Comply 30 63 33
The free-riders Comply Non-comply 7 11 4
The incentivized Non-comply Comply 19 15 41
The non-compliers Non-comply Non-comply 64 31 42
The number of members in each compliance response group
varies for the three compliance cases (Table 2). When the
normative incentive is applied in a low deterrence context, the
non-compliers formed the largest group (64). When the same
normative incentive was applied in a high deterrence context,
the largest group (63) were the compliers. The free-riders are
the smallest group (<10%) across all three compliance cases.
Individuals may respond either consistently or differently to
different management incentives. For the compliers, 28 out
of the 120 participants were consistently compliant across all
compliance cases, whereas 27 of the 120 were consistently
non-compliant. The incentivized and the free-riders were less
consistent across the three compliance cases, only 2 out of the
120 people were consistent free-riders for all three compliance
incentives, and none were consistently incentivized.
There is a chance that the order in which the scenarios
were played will influence the responses and consequently the
compliance response groupings. For example, the comparison
scenario could come before the base scenario for each of the
cases due to the randomized order participants played the
game. Therefore, to account for any ordering effect within these
groupings we checked the representativeness of the full data
set with two sub-samples. We did this by examining whether
there is a statically significant difference in the proportion
of each compliance response group for the full sample and
the sub-samples. The first sub-sample comprised of data from
the first two scenarios played and only the responses that
were in the order of base scenario then comparison scenario
were included (i.e., scenario 1 followed by scenario 2 would
be included as data for case 1, scenario 3 followed by
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TABLE 3 | Summary of psycho-social characteristics.
Variable Definition Description
Low scores High Scores
Expectation of Base scenario An in-time expectation of others’
behaviors as a measure of social
perceptions
Expect few others to exceed catch
limit (other are mostly compliant)
Expect many others to exceed
catch limit (others are mostly
non-compliant)
behavior of others Comparison
scenario
Social norms Measure of the extent in which people
believe in and value social norms
Low belief in and value of social
norms
High belief in and value of social
norms
Ecological values Rejection of human
exemptionalism
Rejection that humans are exempt from
the constraints of nature
Regards the world in terms of
human values and experiences
Regards the world in terms
nature-centered system of values
Environment-alism Concerns for environmental protection
and improvement of the health of the
environment
Low concern for the environment High concern for the environment
Personality type Agreeableness Taxonomy of personality traits Analytical/detached Friendly/compassionate
Conscientious-ness Easy-going/careless Efficient/organized
Extraversion Solitary/reserved Outgoing/energetic
Neuroticism Secure/confident Sensitive/nervous
Openness Consistent/cautious Inventive/curious
Risk preferences The attitude people hold toward risk Risk averse Risk seeking
The possible range for expectation of behavior of others is 0–5, social norms is 14–70, each personality type is 0–10 and risk preferences is 1–5. The two variables of
ecological values are the PCA scores.
scenario 4 would be included as data for case 2, scenario
1 followed by scenario 3 would be included as data for
case 3). The second sub-sample comprised data from all four
scenarios but only responses that were in the correct order
were included (i.e., if a comparison scenario came before a
base scenario it would not be included). These comparisons
show that there is no statistical difference between either
of the sub-samples and the full data set, suggesting that
the randomized order of scenarios did not have an effect
on responses and therefore compliance response groupings.
The proportions for each of the sub-samples and the results
of the proportional comparison statistical tests are found in
Supplementary Appendix B.
Psycho-Social Data
In addition to the compliance decisions that participants made
in the economic experiment, we collected information for each
participant’s psycho-social makeup that might be associated to
their compliance decisions based on a review of the literature.
The timing of data collection is shown in Figure 1. The psycho-
social characteristics considered in this study were (1) expectation
of behavior of others, (2) social norms, (3) ecological values, (4)
personality types, and (5) risk preferences. A description of the
variables relating to each of the five psycho-social characteristics
is provided in Table 3.
Expectations of Behavior of Others
In the experiment, and for each scenario, participants were asked
about their expectation of the number of others they thought
would not comply. They were asked this question at the same
time as they determined the number of fish they were going to
catch. Specifically, we asked “How many of the others in the
group do you think will exceed the catch limit?” We used this data
to create two variables that capture in time expectations of others’
behaviors in both the base scenario and comparison scenario for
each fishery compliance case.
Social Norms
Participants were asked 14 questions on a 5-point Likert
scale that make up the Social Norms Espousal Scale (SNES)
proposed by Bizer et al. (2014). This survey is used to assess
individual differences in the extent to which people believe
in and value social norms. Within this survey participants
are asked to rate the extent to which the statements were
characteristic of them. The statements are framed generally
around the importance and influence of social norms (e.g.,
statement 1: I go out of my way to follow social norms).
Individual question scores are summed and the total is ranked
on a scale representing participants’ values on a low to high value
of social norms scale.
Ecological Values
The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) is a 5-point Likert scale
survey to measure the environmental concern of people. We
used the revised version proposed by Anderson (2012), which
was originally developed by Dunlap and Van Liere to assess
‘’primitive beliefs’ about the nature of the earth and humanity’s
relationship with it” (1978, p. 427). The NEP scale is made
up of 15 statements, within which three questions represent
each of the five hypothesized facets of an ecological worldview,
namely (i) reality of limits to growth, (ii) anti-anthropocentrism,
(iii) the fragility of nature’s balance, (iv) rejection of human,
and (v) possibility of an ecocrisis (Dunlap et al., 2000). The
intention of the survey is to develop a scale of ecological
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values from low ecological paradigm/high social paradigm
to high ecological paradigm/low social paradigm. However,
this scale is only recommended for use when the result of
one question is consistent with the results of the remaining
questions (i.e., have a high corrected item total correlation).
The responses were varied and therefore we did not use the
summed scores from the survey. Instead, we processed the
scores for each of the five hypothesized facets of an ecological
worldview using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
reduce the number of ecological values variables from five
(one per facet) to two. The first component (which explained
45.2% of the data) was defined by one of the five facets;
“rejection of human exemptionalism.” Human exemptionalism
represents the belief that humans are different to all other
animal and exempt from the constraints of nature, and the
world is interpreted more in terms of human values and
experiences (Wallhagen and Magnusson, 2017). The second
component (which explained 20.7% of the data) was defined by
the other four hypothetical facets. We summarized the four facets
to represent environmentalism. Individual loadings on these
components were used as two variables representing ecological
values in our model.
Personality Types
A widely recognized and accepted taxonomy of personality traits
is the “Big Five” (John et al., 1991). These five broad traits are;
agreeableness (analytical/detached vs. friendly/compassionate),
conscientiousness (easy-going/careless vs. efficient/organized),
extraversion (solitary/reserved vs. outgoing/energetic),
neuroticism (secure/confident vs. sensitive/nervous), and
openness (consistent/cautious vs. inventive/curious). The Big-
Five-Inventory was first presented by John et al. (1991) as a
self-reported assessment to measure the five traits. In this study,
we used a 10-item version of the Big-Five-Inventory (Rammstedt
and John, 2007). Unlike the measures for social norm and
ecological values the scores for personality type are not additive,
and so we formed five variables based on their scores for each of
the five personality traits.
Risk Preferences
In addition to the common pool resource game, participants
were asked to undertake a paid experimental exercise in
which they chose from a range of gambles to elicit their risk
preferences. We used the Eckel-Grossman Risk Task (Eckel and
Grossman, 2002) which is an established way of elucidating
risk preferences. Participants were asked to undertake the paid
gamble in which they chose one of six possible gambles which
all have the same 50/50 chance of winning as an assessment
of risk attitudes. The gambles range from a safe bet with
guaranteed but lower payoff, to a higher risk gamble with a
larger payoff. Gambles range from risk averse to risk neutral
to risk seeking.
Compliance Decision and Psycho-Social
Data Analysis
To understand which of the psycho-social characteristics
are related to the four compliance response groups, we
used a multinomial (MNL) regression. We estimated
a separate model for each of the three compliance
cases (Figure 2) to capture the change in participants’
decisions in response to either normative or instrumental
incentives. Each of the three models includes all of
the psycho-social variables as independent variables.
Specifically, for each compliance case k (k = 1,2,3),
we model the probability that individual j belongs to
compliance response group m (m = 1,2,3,4) conditional
on the psycho-social characteristics of the individual,
that is:
pjkm = Prob(yjk = m) = Fkm(x′jβ) (1)
where yjk is an indicator variable that takes value one if individual
j belongs to compliance response group m and zero otherwise.
Fkm is the cumulative distribution function which lies between
zero and one and adds up to one over m; i.e.,
∑
m pjkm = 1 (i.e.,
each individual must belong to one of the response groups). In
equation (1), the psycho-social characteristics of individual j is
denoted by xi and β is a vector of the corresponding parameters.
We used the multinominal logistic model to estimate the
parameters in (1), thereby the cumulative distribution function
is given as:
Fkm(x
′
jβ) =
1
1+∑4m=2 exp(x′jβkm) ,m = 1 (2)
Fkm(x
′
jβ) =
exp(x
′
jβkm)
1+∑4m=2 exp(x′jβkm) ,m = 2, 3, 4 (3)
We set the compliers as the baseline group (m = 1) as the
compliers represent the behavior that we want to emulate (i.e.,
it reflects the desired compliance behavior of recreational fishers
under all management incentives). Given the baseline compliance
response group, the log-odds for all other groups relative to the
baseline group can be calculated as a linear combination of the
psycho-social factors, such that:
ln
(
Prob
(
yjk = m−
)
Prob
(
yjk = 1
) ) = x′jβkm− ,m− = 2, 3, 4 (4)
Therefore, the signs and statistical significance of each
parameter βkm− indicate whether a change in the psycho-social
factor makes an individual’s membership to the compliance
response group m− more or less likely relative to the baseline
group (i.e., compliers). For example, a positive and significant
coefficient for a characteristic for one of the compliance
response groups would suggest a higher probability of an
individual being part of that group. Given the number of
independent variables included in the model (Table 3), the
multicollinearity between each psycho-social factor is of potential
concern in the regression analysis. We calculated the correlation
coefficients and confirmed that the correlation between social
norms, ecological values and risk preferences is relatively low
( < 0.25). Where a correlation coefficient was higher than 0.25
for expectation of behaviors of others and personality type, the
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model results were checked to ensure the multicollinearity did
not confound results.
RESULTS
Expectation of Behavior of Others
Among all the psycho-social factors, expectation of behavior of
others in the base scenario was the most frequent significant
variable in explaining individuals’ membership in the compliance
response group for both the instrumental and normative
incentives (Table 4). For the non-compliers, the coefficient was
positive and significant for compliance cases 1 and 3, indicating
that those who have less faith in others to comply with the catch
limit in the base scenario are more likely to be non-compliers.
Expectation of behavior of others in the base scenario was
consistently significant and positive for the incentivized group
for all the three compliance cases. Conversely, for free-riders,
expectation of others in the base scenario was significant for
compliance case 2, indicating that those who have less faith in
others to comply with the catch limit in the base scenario are less
likely to be free-riders.
Expectation of others’ behavior in the comparison scenario
was only significant for compliance case 2 (Table 4). This
result was found for the non-compliers and the free-riders.
For the non-compliers group, the coefficient was positive and
significant, suggesting those who have less faith in others to
comply in the comparison scenario are more likely to be in
the non-compliers group, reflecting their own behavior as they
are non-compliant in this scenario. For free-riders -who were
compliant in the base scenario, and non-compliant with the
incentive- the result was positive and significant, indicating
that those who have less faith in others to comply with catch
limit with the management incentive applied are more likely
to be in this group. Expectation of others in the comparison
scenario was not significant for any management incentive for
the incentivized group. This suggests that in the case of a
management incentive having the desired effect, the expectation
of others is no longer correlated with an individual’s own behavior
within the comparison scenario.
Social Norms
The estimated coefficient of social norms was not significant
for the non-compliers or the free-riders for any compliance
case (Table 4). The estimated coefficient of social norms was
positive and only significant for the incentivized for compliance
case 3, suggesting that those who have a high value of social
norms are likely to be non-compliant when deterrence is low but
compliant with high deterrence. The coefficient of social norms
was not significant for the incentivized for the normative message
incentives in either a high or low deterrence context which means
there is no association between the value of social norms and the
influence of a normative message on compliance behaviors.
Ecological Values
For the cases where human exemptionalism and
environmentalism is a significant predictor variable, the
direction of the effect is negative, indicating that those with
high ecological values are less likely to be part of the response
groups they were significant for (Table 4). For compliance
case 3, the coefficient of rejection of human exemptionalism
was significant for all response groups and environmentalism
was significant for two response groups, respectively. These
results suggest that those with high ecological values are less
likely to be part of the groups responding in a way other
than complying with an increase in deterrence, which infers
compliers have high ecological values. By contrast, rejection of
human exemptionalism was not significant for any group for
compliance case 1 and for only one group for compliance case
2. This suggests that the link between human exemptionalism
and responses to a normative management incentive is weak.
Likewise, environmentalism was significant for non-compliers
for case 1 and not significant for any groups for case 2, suggesting
that the link between environmentalism and a response to a
normative management incentive is also weak.
Personality Type
The “Big Five” personality traits that are significant in this
analysis all have a negative coefficient (Figure 4). This means
that those who have these personality traits are more likely to
be the compliers (i.e., baseline group). The personality traits
that are significant, however, vary across both compliance cases
and the compliance response group. For example, those with
agreeableness, conscientiousness or extraversion as personality
traits are less likely to be non-compliers in response to
either a normative or an instrumental incentive (Figure 4).
In response to the normative incentive (in compliance cases
1 and 2) extraversion and openness were significant for the
incentivized and the free-riders, respectively, indicating that
those with these personality traits are less likely to be part
of these groups and more likely to be the compliers. Finally,
in response to the instrumental incentive, the coefficient of
conscientiousness was significant and negative again indicating
those with this personality trait are more likely to be compliers
than the incentivized.
Risk Preferences
Risk preference was significant in explaining respondents’
compliance response to both the normative and instrumental
incentives (Table 4). For non-compliers, risk preference was
significant and positive for all compliance cases, suggesting
that those who are risk seeking are more likely to be non-
compliers regardless of the management incentive applied. Risk
preference was also significant and positive for the incentivized
for compliance case 2, suggesting that those who are risk seeking
are more likely to be in this group, which may explain why
they were non-compliant in the base scenario. Risk preference
is significant for the free-riders for compliance case 3. There
are fewer significant results for compliance case 1 (normative in
low deterrence) compared to the other compliance cases, which
may reflect that the risk of being caught in this context is the
lowest and therefore not a strong predictor for the incentivized
or the free-riders.
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TABLE 4 | Multinomial model results on responses to normative and instrumental incentives.
Psycho-social characteristic Compliance Case 1 Normative in low deterrence Compliance Case 2 Normative in high deterrence Compliance Case 3 Instrumental
Non-compliers Free-riders Incentivized Non-compliers Free-riders Incentivized Non-compliers Free-riders Incentivized
Expectation of
behavior of others
Base scenario 0.941*** −0.173 0.895*** 0.311 −0.785* 0.441* 1.108*** 0.219 0.965***
(0.001) (0.676) (0.004) (0.118) (0.071) (0.066) (0.000) (0.637) (0.000)
Comparison
scenario
0.221 0.542 −0.42 0.461* 1.244*** 0.239 0.23 0.542 −0.246
(0.387) (0.215) (0.131) (0.059) (0.006) (0.438) (0.322) (0.184) (0.325)
Social norms 0.068 −0.011 0.052 0.022 0.08 0.04 0.072 0.024 0.081*
(0.120) (0.865) (0.318) (0.516) (0.139) (0.427) (0.123) (0.851) (0.067)
Ecological values Rejection of human
exemptionalism
−0.257 0.003 −0.369 −0.043 −0.096 −0.438* −0.479* −1.267** −0.498**
(0.244) (0.993) (0.149) (0.812) (0.746) (0.084) (0.064) (0.036) (0.037)
Environmentalism −0.629** −0.305 −0.407 −0.05 0.229 −0.075 −0.725** −0.106 −0.607*
(0.047) (0.545) (0.227) (0.848) (0.572) (0.830) (0.038) (0.888) (0.064)
Personality type Agreeableness −0.496** −0.16 0.002 −0.091 −0.288 0.104 −0.189 0.04 −0.342
(0.029) (0.606) (0.992) (0.607) (0.260) (0.641) (0.428) (0.940) (0.119)
Conscientiousness −0.525** 0.108 −0.305 −0.109 0.321 0.068 −0.578** −0.406 −0.504**
(0.014) (0.757) (0.187) (0.496) (0.238) (0.749) (0.017) (0.413) (0.024)
Extraversion −0.009 0.118 −0.433** −0.2 0.187 −0.175 −0.427** −0.36 −0.26
(0.958) (0.666) (0.039) (0.155) (0.384) (0.345) (0.035) (0.365) (0.165)
Neuroticism 0.111 0.122 0.156 −0.17 −0.071 0.326 0.044 0.422 0.103
(0.520) (0.651) (0.423) (0.246) (0.729) (0.126) (0.812) (0.398) (0.534)
Openness −0.142 0.219 0.067 0.003 −0.487* 0.33 0.083 0.696 −0.058
(0.444) (0.475) (0.758) (0.983) (0.056) (0.123) (0.689) (0.132) (0.763)
Risk preferences 0.467** −0.215 −0.149 0.438*** 0.146 0.611** 0.650*** 1.401** 0.335
(0.020) (0.508) (0.518) (0.008) (0.545) (0.014) (0.004) (0.044) (0.103)
Constant 0.366 −3.732 −0.528 −0.938 −4.388 −11.432*** −1.515 −14.034 0.803
(0.905) (0.444) (0.884) (0.741) (0.331) (0.008) (0.662) (0.154) (0.799)
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.331 0.214 0.308
Log-likelihood −91.47 −110.00 −99.86
AIC 254.947 292.002 271.729
Likelihood ratio test (p-value) 2.943e-07*** 0.002725** 4.975e-07***
Number of observations 64 7 19 31 11 15 42 4 41
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses for the three compliance cases. The baseline compliance response group is the compliers. Significant coefficients are bolded, and
significance level are: ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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FIGURE 4 | Multinomial logit model results for personality types for non-compliers, free-riders, and the incentivized for (A) compliance case 1: normative message in
low deterrence, (B) compliance case 2: normative message in high deterrence, and (C) compliance case 3: an increase in deterrence. Coefficients are included, and
error bars indicate standard error. Significant coefficients are highlighted in blue, and significance level are: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Full regression results
are reported in Table 4.
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DISCUSSION
While we know that in fisheries people make trade-off decisions
between following or breaking rules, it is of interest to
determine how people respond to different management
incentives. Accurately understanding the different responses
to instrumental and normative incentives and highlighting
the psycho-social patterns within these responses is highly
relevant for fisheries policy. In our laboratory-based economic
experiment, in which participants faced four hypothetical
fishery scenarios to provide the controlled setting to
measure behavioral responses and to remove any potential
confounding influences, we were able to shed light on this
issue. While this study is framed around a recreational fisheries
context, the compliance problems faced for other natural
resources (Keane et al., 2008) are similar and potentially
similar policy opportunities (as discussed below) may apply.
In this paper, we first identified patterns in compliance
behavior. The pattern reveals a group of people who are
consistently compliant, a group who are consistently non-
compliant, a group who respond counterintuitively, and
a group who are incentivized to become compliant (as
intended by the management incentive). In this paper, we
further explored how the pattern in compliance behavior
is associated with five psycho-social factors, three of which
(perceptions of behavior of others, social norms, and risk
preferences) have separately been explored within the fisheries
compliance literature, while two factors (ecological values and
personality types) had yet to be explored. While information
about these two latter factors is limited within the fisheries
compliance literature, our results suggest that they are relevant
predictors for individuals’ compliance response to different
management incentives.
To summarize the findings, we combine results for individual
factors into umbrella factors to conceptually present the results
in Figure 5. For example, the umbrella factor expectation of
others’ behavior combines the results of base scenario and
comparison scenario, ecological values represents both rejection
of human exemptionalism and environmentalism and personality
types includes all five personality factors. The shading of the
segments indicates that at least one of the included factors for
the umbrella factor is significant (but not necessarily all of them).
The aim of this study was to compare the role of psycho-social
characteristics of individual fishers in explaining responses to
an instrumental and normative management incentives. Each
of the umbrella factors is statistically significant in explaining
compliance behavior in at least one compliance case and for at
least one of the three compliance response groups (Figure 5).
For example, one consistent result across both the normative
and instrumental incentive was the relationship between risk
preferences and non-compliance. The expectation of others’
behavior was also the most frequently statistically significant
factor (in 7 of the 9 cases1 – dark green shaded segment
in Figure 5).
1There are a total of nine cases, three response groups (compared to the
“compliers”) and three compliance cases.
Broadly we see that more psycho-social factors were
statistically significant in explaining the behavior of non-
compliers and the incentivized compared to the free-riders.
Individual’s membership in the free-riders is the hardest to
predict based on the five psycho-social factors. This may be
due to the low number of observations for this group and
therefore the results for this group must be interpreted with
care. Moreover, we can see that more psycho-social factors
explain behavioral responses to an instrumental incentive than a
normative incentive (Figure 5). Ecological values, for example,
was consistently a significant predictor for responses to an
instrumental incentive but not for either of the normative
incentives. The results suggest that there is a relationship between
having high environmental values and acting consistently
compliant because the relationship between ecological values
and all other response groups (non-compliers, free-riders, and
the incentivized) was negative and significant. That is to say,
the compliers have higher environmental values than any other
group in response to an instrumental incentive, suggesting
that compliance behavior could be encouraged by increasing
environmental values and concern. These results are consistent
with the behavioral literature suggesting a link between high
environmental values and pro-environmental behavior (Nuyen,
2011; Ones et al., 2015).
Social norms was only significant for the incentivized
for the instrumental incentive. Social norms was expected
to be a significant predictor, especially for the incentivized
in response to the normative incentives. However, we
find that social perceptions of others’ behaviors are more
effective at representing the implicit expectations of an
individual. The results for expectation of others’ behavior
suggests that when participants are non-compliant they think
others are also exceeding the catch limit. This behavior,
also known as false consensus or pluralistic ignorance, can
lead to misperceived norms and reinforce non-compliant
behavior (Berkowitz, 2005; Rimal and Real, 2005). Targeting
these misconceptions results in a more accurate normative
feedback with expected improved compliance (Bergseth and
Roscher, 2018). This can be achieved through highlighting
pro-compliance perceptions and norms of fishers as well as
reporting consequences of non-compliant behavior (Bova
et al., 2017; Bergseth and Roscher, 2018). This could resemble
social punishment through shame and moral unacceptance
of non-compliance as well as traditional deterrence such as
fines (Thomas et al., 2016; Mackay et al., 2018). The SNES
survey is intended to assess individual differences in the
extent to which people believe in and value social norms,
however, from our results it was related to the response to
the instrumental incentive. Although instrumental incentives
are expected to crowd out social or moral norms (Kroneberg
et al., 2010; Barile et al., 2015), we find that high social norms
value complements the effectiveness of the instrumental
compliance incentive.
There were differences in behavioral responses to an
instrumental incentive and a normative incentive for different
personality traits. For the instrumental incentive introversion
was inferred for non-compliers for the case of an increase
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FIGURE 5 | Conceptual summary of the results. Shaded segments indicate if one of the factors included in the umbrella factors was significant and left unshaded if
not significant. *Expectation of others combines the results of base scenario and comparison scenario, Ecological values represents both rejection of human
exemptionalism and environmentalism, and∞Personality types includes all five personality traits.
in deterrence. Non-compliant behavior has been found to
be associated with introversion but only when combined
with high neuroticism (Gudjonsson et al., 2004), however,
neuroticism was not a significant personal trait in our results.
The results also indicated a low likelihood of being non-
compliant or the incentivized in response to an increase
in deterrence for those with high conscientiousness. Low
conscientiousness is associated with impulsivity (Sharma et al.,
2014). This suggests that impulsivity may be related to non-
compliance when there is a low chance of being caught
but it is over shadowed when there is a higher chance of
being caught.
Low conscientiousness is also linked to deviousness (Salgado,
2004), which may explain why the trait is found to be
associated with those who are non-compliant in response to
the normative incentive in a low deterrence context. However,
we did not find this result for the normative incentive in
a high deterrence context, suggesting that the risk of being
caught may overshadow the tendency to be devious. The only
personality type that was significant for normative incentive in
high deterrence was openness. Specifically, our result suggests
that those who are open are unlikely to be free-riders for
the normative incentive in a high deterrence context. This
may infer that free-riders have low openness as part of
their personalities. A low score for openness represents a
consistent and cautious personality which would be unexpected
for the free-riders as they become non-compliant and at risk
of a penalty. This result is somewhat counterintuitive, but
may be associated with the low number of observations for
this group.
For normative incentive in a low deterrence context,
personality types were more frequently statistically significant.
The results for non-compliers for this management incentive
infer low agreeableness and low conscientiousness. People
with low agreeableness tend to be less cooperative and more
competitive in groups (Graziano and Eisenberg, 1997), which
may explain the non-compliant behavior as participants may be
acting competitively to make more money in the experiment.
The results may reflect that the compliers are more agreeable
which has been linked to prosocial and altruistic behaviors
(Graziano et al., 1997). Introversion is expected to correlate
with compliance behavior since a typical introvert is depicted
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as a responsible person who is expected to be compliant
(Gudjonsson et al., 2004). Consistent with the expectation, the
results suggest introversion is associated with the incentivized
for the case of normative incentives in low deterrence.
This suggests that introversion is correlated with compliant
behavior for a normative incentive and non-compliers for an
instrumental incentive.
Future Research
In this study, we explore what psycho-social characteristics of
individuals are associated with responses to instrumental and
normative management incentives in a recreational fisheries
context, yet there are some caveats to consider when interpreting
the results.
First, we use a controlled environment via an economic
experiment with student participants, which is useful for
minimizing potential confounders. However, WEIRD (western,
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) participants
made up the study sample and are sometimes criticized as
not being representative of the general population (Levitt
and List, 2007; Loomis, 2014). No difference in behavioral
patterns or overestimations of social preferences were found
between student and non-student samples in other studies
(Janssen et al., 2011; Exadaktylos et al., 2013; Falk et al., 2013).
Therefore, the policy implications that can be drawn from
these findings can contribute toward improving compliance
management since a better understanding of recreational fishers’
behavior can reduce unintended outcomes of management
interventions (Pine et al., 2009) and better predict and assist
how recreational fisheries adapt to changing environments
and evolve to maintain resilience and sustainability on a
global scale (Arlinghaus et al., 2013). In fact, the heterogeneity
of fishers is thought to be a key ingredient of the complex
dynamics of recreational fisheries and key for better management
(Johnston et al., 2010; Post, 2013). We do recognize that different
demographics in a fishery or alternate natural resource context
may result in different conclusions. For example, an area for
further research not within the scope of this study would be
to examine the influence of socioeconomic characteristics
and their interaction with psycho-social characteristics.
For example, dependency on fishery/resource (Karper and
Lopes, 2014), scale of corruption (Akpalu and Mohammed,
2013), and socioeconomic inequalities and mortality risk
(Pepper and Nettle, 2017) -that leads to making more
present-orientated behaviors rather than future-orientated
behaviors- are key domains worth exploring in terms of
compliance responses that is applicable across resource and
location context.
Second, while we find that the normative message in the
experiment changed behavior, a normative expectation can be
strengthened on the belief that others think they should or
have an obligation to conform to the norm (Bicchieri and
Xiao, 2009). We envisage that future work can explore the use
of normative messages that are not only based on what the
wider group is doing but where the message suggests there is
a consciousness of what is accepted by others to strengthen the
normative expectations (Reno et al., 1993). We also acknowledge
that there are a number of alternative psycho-social drivers to
explore in relation to compliance responses. For example, while
we found links between personality traits that are linked to
impulsivity, it may be worth exploring the link between behavior
and impulsivity directly (Maccallum et al., 2007). Additionally,
the role of self-control has been explored in the trade-off between
short term temptation to be selfish and long term pro-social
behavior (Martinsson et al., 2010), which would be highly
applicable to natural resource use and actions impacting the
global climate.
Finally, there are several findings from this study and while
we have highlighted the findings that we determined to be
the most novel within the fisheries compliance literature, we
acknowledge that there are many dimensions to the results
and a number of interesting results were not developed in
the discussion. For example, while some results were as
expected such as the link between high environmental values
and pro environmental behavior there is an opportunity
for more research in to the less expected and more specific
associations such as between expectation of others and
specific personality types and risk preferences. There scope
for more research investigating interacting psycho-social
characteristics which will add richness to the discussion of
compliance behavior.
CONCLUSION
People respond differently to management incentives and often
they respond in a way that is contradictory to expectation.
While there are different instrumental and normative incentives
that can be used to influence compliance behavior, the aim of
this study was to explore the association between individual
psycho-social characteristics and compliance responses.
We explored five psycho-social factors: expectations of
others’ behavior, social norms, ecological values, personality
types, and risk preferences. Our results highlight there
are different psycho-social factors associated with certain
compliance response behaviors. For example, risk seeking
is associated with people who can be categorized as non-
compliers. There are certain behaviors that are harder to
predict, for example for people who behave contrary to
the compliance incentive, who we labeled free-riders. We
acknowledge findings outside the laboratory experimental
context and fishery example may vary from these conclusions,
but we offer a number of policy suggestions based on the
results of our findings, such as emphasizing the risk of non-
compliance and using compliance campaigns that target
encouraging environmental concerns. The findings underline
that there is significant heterogeneity in the associations
between psycho-social make-up and compliance behaviors.
Knowledge of this behavioral relationship can progress
fisheries management toward increased innovation by
encouraging the management of the individual fisher rather
than the average fisher. In the context of managing people
the whole may not be greater than the sum of the parts,
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 13 September 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 579213
fmars-07-579213 September 22, 2020 Time: 19:49 # 14
Mackay et al. Individual Characteristics and Compliance Behavior
as modifying behavior requires nuance and specifics rather that
generalities and ambiguity.
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